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Introduction
The victim has become the main source of legitimacy for transitional justice. More specifically, the legitimacy of transitional justice currently derives from the contribution it makes to the recognition of victims. 1 This deserves explanation. Since the late twentieth century, transitional justice mechanisms have increasingly accompanied political transitions from dictatorship to democracy or from internal war to peace. The demand for punishment and truth has led to the implementation of judicial and non-judicial instruments for dealing with past human GIGA Working Papers rights violations. These instruments include national and international trials, truth commissions, reparations programmes, lustrations, and official memorialisation mechanisms such as monuments, museums, and school curricula. 2 The rapid proliferation of transitional justice mechanisms provided a nurturing environment for an academic and political enterprise that brought about professionalism, standardisation, refinement, and victim-sensitivity (Bonacker, Oettler and Safferling 2013; Oettler 2015) . In her now-classic reconstruction of the evolution of transitional justice, Teitel (2003) described the shift in focus from the perpetrators to national reconciliation and the needs of victims. The invention and proliferation of alternative mechanisms of accountability fundamentally changed the roles of victims. What was at stake in trials such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals was the individual responsibility for crimes, and victims' voices constituted one source of evidence. Truth commissions, in contrast,
were invented as victim-centred mechanisms focusing on healing via storytelling and the public acknowledgement of crimes. Importantly, the victim's testimony became the groundwork for shared collective memory and the constitution of a democratic society. In this sense, the victim was recognised and "put in the centre of the states' post-atrocity strategies to reform governance, rehabilitate state authority and promote reconciliation" (Humphrey 2003: 72) .
There are various reasons for this shift in focus towards victims. First, insights into the nature of traumatic experiences and the psychological needs of relatives of the disappeared met with the challenge of "settling a past account without upsetting a present transition" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 28) . Second, the evolution of restorative mechanisms of transitional justice is closely associated with the global diffusion of human rights and the activities of international advocacy groups and local social movements (Bonacker, Oettler and Safferling 2013; Bonacker 2013) .
It is probably no exaggeration to state that the ethical imperative of recognising the suffering of victims of human rights violations has moved to the centre stage of peace processes.
This paper uses my general observations from recent fieldwork in Colombia as a starting point for theoretical reflection. Most strikingly, the figure of the victim is omnipresent in public discourses on Colombian peace. The centrality of victims' needs, feelings, and interests to the peace process was highlighted, for instance, in President Santos's Nobel Lecture on 10 December 2016 at the Oslo City Hall. While the lecture presented the Colombian peace agreement as the world's most ambitious and innovative forerunner in peacemaking, it also highlighted both diversity and the victims' feelings. The only voice that spoke, however, was Santos himself, who did not give a speaking part to the victims he was talking about. other example is the declaration "Building Paths to Peace," which was adopted by the World Summit of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates on 4 February 2017 in Bogotá. The declaration highlights four key lessons of the Colombian peace process, including the following: "Negotiation began with a fundamental principle: The reclaiming and guarantee of the rights of victims to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition is at the center of the solution of conflict." 4 It is important to note that this sentence refers to recognition without explicitly incorporating the term "recognition." The "reclaiming and guarantee" of rights constitutes a reciprocal double action that is, in other words, a relation of recognition.
This paper aims to elaborate on and extend existing theories on the nexus between transitional justice, recognition, and power. The following section briefly introduces current debates on recognition, juxtaposing affirmative and sceptical approaches to the identity-related effects of recognition. Beginning from a critical look at the power-related implications of the conflict theory of recognition, introduced by Bertram and Celikates, the paper highlights the asymmetric nature of relations of recognition. In order to make this notion of asymmetric cess is the first in the world that has placed the victims and their rights at the center of the solution.
[…] Victims want justice, but most of all they want to know the truth, and they -in a spirit of generosity -desire that no new victims should suffer as they did.
[…] And it has been just this way. Whenever I had the chance, I listened to the victims of this war and heard their heartbreaking stories. Some of them are here with us today, reminding us why it is so important to build a stable and lasting peace. Leyner Palacios is one of them. On May 2, 2002, a homemade mortar launched by the FARC, in the middle of a combat with the paramilitaries, landed on the church in his town, Bojayá, where its inhabitants had sought refuge. Nearly eighty women, men and children -most of the victims were children! -died. In a matter of seconds, Leyner lost 32 relatives, including his parents and three younger brothers. The FARC has asked for forgiveness for this atrocity, and
Leyner, who is now a community leader, has forgiven them. That is the great paradox I have found: while many who have not suffered the conflict in their own flesh are reluctant to accept peace, the victims are the ones who are most willing to forgive, to reconcile, and to face the future with a heart free of hate.
[…] As such, the Colombian peace agreement is a ray of hope in a world troubled by so many conflicts and so much intol- In a world where wars and conflicts are fuelled by hatred and prejudice, we must find the path of forgiveness and reconciliation. In a world where borders are increasingly closed to immigrants, where minorities are attacked and people deemed different are excluded, we must be able to coexist with diversity and appreciate the way it can enrich our societies. We are human beings after all. For those of us who are believers, we are all God's children. We are part of this magnificent adventure of being alive and populating this planet. At our core, there are no inherent differences: not the colour of our skin; nor our religious beliefs; nor our political ideologies, nor our sexual preferences. All these are simply facets of humanity's diversity. (Online: <www.
nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2016/santos-lecture_en.html> 18 July 2017). 
Recognition
The idea of recognition has emerged as a key concept in social theory, and there are a diversity of overlapping, complementary or even competing approaches. Recognition is a category of paramount importance for transitional justice theory because it encompasses a multifaceted matrix of social practices related to the experience of human rights abuse and subsequent struggles. The term "recognition" connects to experiences of violent non-recognition and to subsequent struggles for recognition that entail the probability of misrecognition.
In his highly influential theory, Honneth (1995) focuses on the structural transformation of recognition. According to Honneth, the differentiation between three social spheres of recognition -the private/intimate sphere, the sphere of citizenship, and the sphere of labour relations -originated in modernity and the development of capitalist society. These spheres of recognition correspond with three patterns of recognition (associated with specific forms of relation-to-self): love (self-confidence), legal rights (self-respect), and social esteem (selfesteem) (Honneth 1995: 129) . This simplified tripartite division encompasses a variety of mutual relations of recognition, from early childhood experiences to political social life. It is remarkable that it is possible to apply this heuristic concept to the context of mass violence.
There are equivalent patterns of extreme forms of brutal non-recognition/deprivation. First, survivors of mass violence often experience emotional numbness, anxiety, fear, shame, estrangement from others, mistrust, sexual disorders, self-destructive behaviour, and/or restless sleep. These post-traumatic symptoms point to the devastating effects of mass violence on self-confidence and self-esteem. Within the legal sphere, extreme non-recognition means the deprivation of the "right to have rights" (Arendt) . The exercise of torture, sexual assault, assassination, disappearances, massacres, and so forth shatters lifeworlds and disrupts identities. At the same time, however, the experience of non-recognition motivates the struggle for justice and recognition.
A key controversy in current debates revolves around whether or not recognition has a positive effect on identity. According to Honneth, recognition is a precondition for realising a positive relation-to-self. In his argument on multiculturalism, Taylor (1992) focuses on the public recognition of difference that is equal respect. He considers recognition of specific cultures and ways of life a precondition for self-respect and effective autonomy. There are, however, sceptical views that highlight the ambivalence inherent in practices of recognition.
"Recognition is at once the norm toward which we invariably strive […] [and] the name given to the process that constantly risks destruction" (Butler 2004: 133) . Processes of recognition serve to acknowledge identities that are shattered by misrecognition or non-recognition. At the same time, these identities are formed through recognition. Taylor argues that nonrecognition "can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being" (Taylor 1992: 25) . The same can be said for the way recognition works. The "effect is to impose a single, drastically simplified group-identity which denies the complexity of people's lives, the multiplicity of their identifications and the cross-pulls of their various affiliations" (Fraser 2000: 112) . This insight leads to the radical conclusion that misrecognition is the only possible form of recognition (Bedorf 2010: 144) . Each act of recognition is unavoidably an act of misrecognition, because it is incomplete with regard to the perceived and recognised dimensions of identity.
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Betram and Celikates propose a conflict approach to recognition, pointing out that "[r]elations of recognition are established and (con)tested in and through conflicts" (Bertram and Celikates 2015: 852) . They "must always be constituted anew time and again" and they "are only realized when individuals or groups are capable of negotiating divergent normative claims" (ibid.). These points -the permanent and conflictive process of (re-)establishing relations of recognition and the capability to face and handle conflict -are taken up in Section 4. What is important at this point in the argument is the statement that recognition "is always also realized symmetrically as a reciprocal interaction" (ibid.).
Recognition is indeed a reciprocal interaction, but reciprocity is essentially shaped by power. Social relations are relations of power, and relations of recognition are no exception.
There is, though, a high degree of fluctuating asymmetry, with varying forms of coercion, authoritative power, resistance, and struggle. The closer one looks at the relation of recognition, the more sophisticated the picture becomes. Ikäheimo has proposed a formula describing the structure of recognition. Recognition means "A recognizing B as C in the dimension of D, Table 1 demonstrates).
In what follows, I outline some meanings of "power" in order to determine its specific meaning in the context of transitional justice and recognition. Perhaps the most fundamental dimension of power in relations of recognition is authoritative power. In its most fundamental sense, power is the "production of intended effects" (Russell 2004 (Russell [1938 : 23). It is a "quantitative concept […] A has more power than B, if A achieves many intended effects and B only a few" (ibid). From a relational perspective, power has famously 7 On the other hand, there is indeed a high degree of semantic inaccuracy in classical theory. Weber's "3 Typen legitimer Herrschaft" (three types of legitimate rule) are often translated as traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic authority (or rule). Actually, Weber's terminology is inaccurate and imprecise. He describes rule (Herrschaft) as a "specific form of power" ("Sonderfall von Macht") and names two poles of rule: rule by virtue of constellations of interest ("Herrschaft kraft Interessenkonstellation," e.g. economic monopoly) and rule by virtue of authority (command and obedience, e.g. patriarchal power [hausväterliche Gewalt]) (Weber 1966, Vol . II: chap. 9/I/ §1: 691). According to Weber, rule (Herrschaft) refers to the situation "that a manifested will ('command') of the 'ruler' or the 'rulers' is intended to influence others' (the 'ruled') actions and actually does influence them in such a way that this action -to a socially relevant degree -occurs as if the ruled had turned the content of the command -for its own sake -into the maxim of their conduct ('obedience')" (Weber 1966, Vol Dahl (1957: 202-203) There are three Foucaultian ideas that seem to be useful in analysing the nexus between transitional justice, recognition, and power: power refers to multidirectional relationships of power; truth is inside power; and recognition is an indispensable element of power relationships.
Departing from these ideas, the following explores two more approaches to power that are complementary. Unlike the Weberian concept of "command-and-obedience," Heinrich Popitz, one of the lesser-known German sociologists, offers an illuminating perspective on authority. He suggests that authority is a form of power associated with social dependency.
"Authority seems like weaponless power. But its effects go beyond the mere adaptation of behaviour. Authority causes psychic adaptation, the adoption of the authority figure's perspectives and criteria and, thus, a conformity that needs no control" (Popitz 1981: 79, trans. A. O.). Popitz goes on to argue that these effects of authority can only be properly understood as the result of a process of recognition. This process has to do with the "yearning to be recognised by others, by this other, who becomes authority, because recognition by him seems to be particularly urgent, so urgent, that ultimately our self-recognition, our self- Yet another idea to be examined here connects directly to the previous arguments. Bourdieu suggests that "objective relations of power tend to reproduce themselves in relations of symbolic power. In the symbolic struggle for the production of common sense or, more precisely, for the monopoly over legitimate meaning, agents put into action the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles and which may be juridically guaranteed" (Bourdieu: 1989: 21) . It follows that if the "monopoly over legitimate meaning" is of key importance, then official discourse has certain effects. Bourdieu also stresses, like Foucault and Popitz, the aspect of recognition. Official discourse "performs a diagnostic, that is, an act of knowledge or cognition, which begets recognition and which, quite often, tends to assert what a person or a thing is and what it is universally, for every possible person, thus objectively" (Bourdieu 1989: 22) . What is at stake here is a knowledge-based act of recognition that is key to structuring and making the social world. Bourdieu goes on to state that the "power to make groups" (Bourdieu 1989: 23) is the preeminent form of symbolic power.
This idea, again, is of key importance for our understanding of the nexus between transitional justice, recognition, and power. "The power to impose upon other minds a vision, old or new, of social divisions depends on the social authority acquired in previous struggles" (Bourdieu 1989: 23) . In recognising victims of mass violence, actors discursively create defenders of the nation state, bystanders, and profiteers. The ability to impose a specific version of the past, however, is determined by social authority and thus, the acceptance of these speakers as relevant judges. Although official discourse imposes a specific vision, it is also linked to persistent conflicts between different symbolic powers. What is significant here is that this idea refers to the conflict theory of recognition. Consider the Nobel Prize speech of President Santos again. When the Colombian president spoke on behalf of the victims, he assumed the power "to create groups" and to structure and create social worlds. He discursively "created" a group of victims "willing to forgive, to reconcile" (see note 3). This group was represented by Leyner Palacios, who lost 32 relatives in a FARC attack and forgave the perpetrators. Notably, victims' interests ("victims want justice, but most of all they want to know the truth") are presented as the foundation of a specific approach to transitional justice, the one "that enables us to secure a maximum of justice without sacrificing peace." This statement points to the second group Santos is "creating" here: the group of "us," the Colombian nation, made up of human beings without "inherent differences: not the colour of our skin, nor our religious beliefs, nor our political ideologies, nor our sexual preferences."
These lines delineate the field of non-sanctioned statements, or, in other words, the field of what was sayable, in December 2016. At the same time, however, they refer to struggles between symbolic powers. On the one hand, Santos delivered his speech a few weeks after the plebiscite on the peace accords was lost (with the debate on so-called "gender ideology" being a main feature of the campaign for a "no" vote) and amidst declining popularity. On the other hand, Santos's statements testify to certain real effects of critical counter-knowledge, such as the truth about victims' needs and the relevance of diversity. Truth-making, though, works in multiple directions: from above and from below, but never outside of asymmetrical power relations.
Recognition in Practice
At the 
Conclusions
Recognition is ambivalent. It helps in overcoming the devastating effects of mass violence and is considered a precondition for regaining a positive relation-to-self (self-determination, self-esteem, effective autonomy). On the other hand, relations of recognition entail power and social dependency, and recognition is never devoid of misrecognition, which imposes simplified or distorted identities.
If recognition involves a fundamental ambivalence -with self-recognition and selfesteem depending on recognition by an authority figure -some doubts may arise with regard to the real effects of recognition practices. The ongoing controversies about the preconditions for and consequences of (transitional) justice remind us of the need to continue uncovering the modalities that may lead to peace. Many activists suggest that recognition is of key importance for victims. At the same time, however, it carries the risk of misrecognition.
Transitional justice scholars have debated this two-sided coin of recognition effects for some tivity, with healing and the public acknowledgement of crimes being their main sources of legitimacy, the underlying ambivalence deserves further attention. Finally, yet importantly, this paper's theoretical perspective on authoritative power raises some doubts with regard to the possibility of reconciliation.
